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This study involves the relationships between health, medical expendi-
ture and labor force participation, and implement these relationships in policy
evaluations.
The first chapter examines the relationships between health, labor force
participation and medical spending in a simultaneous equations model using
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). It finds a significant
positive effect of health on labor force participation. The estimation results of
medical spending equation show that healthier individuals spend less on their
medical care and surprisingly, employment status has no significant effect on
medical spending. Interestingly, employment status does impact health status
positively. The most puzzling result is the significant negative coefficient on
medical spending in the health equation.
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The puzzling result motivates this dynamic heterogeneous agent model
of Chapter Two to study the relationships between health status, medical ex-
penditure and employment. In this model, individuals value both consumption
and health and they are heterogeneous in their health levels and employment
status. Individuals choose how much to spend on medical care and consump-
tion. Health can be accumulated from investment in medical care and this
increases both job opportunities and quality of life. The structural parameters
are estimated by an indirect inference procedure which matches the simulated
regression coefficients to the data regression coefficients from the Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey. This chapter finds that the simulated coefficient of
medical expenditure in the health equation is negative even though in the
health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure im-
pacts the health in the positive way. This paper also explains the basis for
this result.
Chapter Three is a policy application of the model developed in chapter
Two. It builds on the model of Chapter Two and adds the employer-provided
health insurance. It concentrates on measuring the welfare cost of mandating
employer provided health insurance. It compares the welfare of the working-
aged individuals before and after the mandate and finds a welfare loss of 0.7
percent of GDP.
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Chapter 1
Health Status, Medical Spending and Labor
Force Participation
This chapter examines the relationships between health, labor force
participation and medical spending in a simultaneous equations model using
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). It finds a significant
positive effect of health on labor force participation. The estimation results of
medical spending equation show that healthier individuals spend less on their
medical care and surprisingly, employment status has no significant effect on
medical spending. Interestingly, employment status does impact health status
positively. The most puzzling result is the significant negative coefficient on
medical spending in the health equation.
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between health status and labor force participation
has been explored extensively in the literature. The relationship is important
for policy makers to know in order to assess the effectiveness and solvency of
the employment and health related policies. Most of the previous researches
simply considers how health impacts labor force participation and suggests
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poor health reduces the capacity to work and has substantive effects on labor
force participation. Currie and Madrian (1999) has a detailed review of them.
But since health status and labor force participation have mutual effects of
each other, a simultaneous equations model has been used by Stern (1989),
followed by Cai and Kalb (2004) to endogenize both factors.
For the previous literature, almost all of them focus on the effects of
elderly working individuals’ health on their labor force participation decisions
which is motivated by the increase of early retirement of older men. Cai and
Kalb (2004) is an exception and explores the effect for individuals at all working
ages in an Australian context. This paper focuses on the individuals at all
working ages but in the U.S. context. Furthermore, no one in the literature of
the relationship between health status and labor force participation addresses
how medical care expenditures impact health.
As we all know, medical care expenditure in U.S. now is almost 15 per-
cent of its total GDP (Source: CMS, Office of the Actuary, National Health
Statistics Group.). It must have played a big role in people’s health. Rosen-
zweig and Schultz (1983, 1988, 1991), Corman et al.(1987), Grossman and
Joyce(1990), and Joyce(1994) consider the effects of some health inputs such
as mother’s prenatal care and smoking behavior on baby’s health. They use
baby’s weight as a measure of baby’s health and use income, education and
price of medical care service as instruments for medical care. Stratmann (1999)
estimates the effect of doctor visits on work day loss using the types of health
insurance as instruments for doctor visits and finds negative coefficients on
2
doctor visits. In that study, the work day loss is the loss due a certain health
condition. Three different types of health conditions used in three separate
regressions are influenza, impairments and asthma. And doctors’ visits are
those visits which contribute to the treatment of those conditions. No suffi-
cient work has been done to evaluate directly how medical care expenditures
impact health for the working age individuals. This paper considers the effect
of out-of-pocket medical expenses of working age people on their health.
The relationships among health status, medical expenses and labor
force participation are examined in a simultaneous equations model in this
paper using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The paper is arranged
as follows: Section 2 discusses different health measures used in the literature
and the health measure used in this paper. Section 3 outlines the modeling
strategy. Section 4 describes the data and model specifications. Section 5
presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses a
certain unsolved issues in this paper which deserves future work.
1.2 Measure of Health
In the literature of the relationship between health status and labor
force participation, there are extensive debates on what kinds of measure to
use for health: whether it should be an objective measure such as the presence
of chronic and acute conditions and nutritional status(e.g., height, weight, or
body mass index (BMI)) or it should be a subjective measure such as self-
assessed health status derived from individuals’ responses to survey questions:
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“would you describe your health as excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”
or “Does your health limit the amount or kind of work you can do”. For the
objective measure, indicators for specific conditions may not be very directly
related to ones’ productivity (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Individuals who
lost one limb may be highly productive as a typist. At the mean time, the
objective measure suffers the measurement error too. As for the subjective
measures, they may be more directly related to productivity but they may
also be more subject to reporting biases. Individuals who have exited the
labor force may be more likely to report that they have poor health status and
functional limitations to rationalize their behavior. Currie and Madrian (1999)
and Cai and Kalb (2004) both have detailed discussions of different measures.
When self-reported measures are used, health seems to play a larger role and
economic factors a smaller one on the labor force participation than when
more objective measures are used (Bound 1991). While self-reported health
measure still remains a popular measure for health, it is still an open question
as for which measure is the best to use.
The health measure used in this paper is the Physical Component Sum-
mary (PCS) scores formed from the answers to the Short-Form 12 questions
(Table 1.1). There are both physical and mental health questions in these
Short-Form 12 questions. There are two forms of summary scores: PCS and
MCS (Mental Component Summary).1 PCS puts more weight on physical
1As for how to calculate these summary scores, please refer to ’Ware,Jr., J.E., Kosinski,
M., and Keller, S. How to Score the SF-12(r)Physical and Mental Health Summary Scales
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health questions than MCS does. The PCS scores have several advantages
over the self-reported health measure mentioned above.
First, the reason why researchers concern about the rationalization
problem in the self-reported health measure is that most of the existing lit-
erature is on the elderly working age individuals. Some of them retire early
because of their poor health but the others exit the labor force early because
of other reasons such as leisure since they already have enough savings. If they
retire earlier than 65 then they are not eligible for medicare and have to pay for
the expensive health insurance. It is highly possible for them to go to doctor’s
office more often and report poor health in order to qualify for the disability
health insurance which is covered by the social security insurance. However,
this paper concentrates on all working age individuals and the elderly is only
a small proportion of it so it is probably not such a big issue.
Second, the self-assessed health status used in the existing literature
all comes from the same set of interview as the other information such as
employment, income and demographic characteristics. Individuals assess their
health after they are asked about the employment and other related questions.
It is highly possible for them to rationalize their answers to health questions.
The Short-Form 12 questions used in this paper is from a self-administered
questionnaire (SAQ), a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, delivered to the inter-
viewers by mail. The SAQ is designed to collect a variety of health status and
(Third Edition).(September 1998) QualityMetric,Inc., Lincoln,RI.’. This manual can be
purchased from QualityMetric,Inc.
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health care quality measures from adults and it is separated and conducted at
different time from the personal interview which has the employment, income
and other information. Individuals may be more candid to sensitive questions,
such as health status, when filling out a self-completion form rather than be-
ing interviewed (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996) and knowing that it is only a
health care quality survey.
Third, the self-assessed health status used in the existing literature is
too general to compare across different individuals. Individuals always feel
good about themselves tend to give more optimistic answers. Most of the
Short-Form 12 questions are very specific questions which are very straight
forward to answer. In addition, there is a mental health component in the
PCS scores.
Lastly, the PCS and MCS scores have been tested by health profession-
als. Hurst et al. (1998) test them on rheumatoid arthritis (RA) patients and
find that the SF12 is a reliable, valid and responsive measure of health status
in the majority of RA patients, and meets standards required for comparing
groups of patients. Melville et al. (2003) find that quality of life assessment us-
ing the short form 12 questionnaire is as reliable and sensitive as the short form
36 in distinguishing symptom severity in myocardial infarction survivors. Luo
et al. (2003) find that the short form 12-item survey demonstrated good in-
ternal consistency reliability, construct validity, and responsiveness in patients
with back pain. The most thorough and extensive research on the validity of
the PCS and MCS scores has been conducted by Avery et al. (2004). The re-
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search tests the scores on various chronic conditions such as diabetes, arthritis,
heart disease, stroke, cancer and so on and different risk factors such as high
blood pressure, smoking status, body mass index and so on against different
population groups.
1.3 The Model and Methods of Estimation
Some of the researchers explore the mutual effects of health and labor
force participation but none of them take into consideration of the impact of
individuals’ medical spending on their health. But if the medical spending is
considered in the health equation, it becomes endogenous too since individuals’
health and employment status also have impacts on their medical spending.
The model in this paper is a simultaneous equations model of health status,
labor force participation and medical expenditure. It takes the following forms:
h = α1l + α2m+X0α3 +X1α4 + ε1
l = β1h+X0β2 +X2β3 + ε2
m = γ1h+ γ2l +X0γ3 +X3γ4 + ε3
where h, l and m are endogenous variables, h is individual’s health,
l is individual’s labor force participation decision and m is individual’s out-
of-pocket medical expenditure. X0, X1, X2 and X3 are exogenous variables;
X1, X2 and X3 are excluded variables from the other equations. By assump-
tion, E(ε1Z) = 0, E(ε2Z) = 0, E(ε3Z) = 0, and Z = (X0 X1 X2 X3).
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Table 1.1: The SF-12 Questions:
General health today poor, fair, good, very good, excellent
During a typical day, limitations in limited a lot, limited a little,
moderate activities not limited
During a typical day, limitations in limited a lot, limited a little,
climbing several flights of stairs not limited
During past 4 weeks, as result of
physical health, accomplished
less that would like yes/no
During past 4 weeks, as result of
physical health, limited in kind
of work or other activities yes/no
During past 4 weeks, as result of
mental problems, accomplished
less that would like yes/no
During past 4 weeks, as result of
mental problems, limited in kind
of work or other activities yes/no
During past 4 weeks, pain interfered not at all, a little bit, moderately,
with normal work outside the home quite a bit, extremely
and housework
During the past 4 weeks, felt calm all the time, most of the time,
and peaceful good bit of time,some of the time,
little of the time, none of the time
During the past 4 weeks, had a Same As Above
lot of energy
During the past 4 weeks, felt Same As Above
downhearted and blue
During past 4 weeks, physical Same As Above
health or emotional problems
interfered with social activities
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The model can be consistently estimated by a two step procedure pro-
posed by Maddala (1983). The two step procedure is similar to two stage least
squares but with the possibility of allowing for the nonlinear regressions. In
the first step, each endogenous variable in the system is regressed on all the
exogenous variables. Then in the second step, we estimate each equation in
the system replacing the endogenous variables with their fitted value , and
from the first step.
1.4 Data and model specification
1.4.1 The data
The data used for this paper come from the Household Component of
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The MEPS HC is a nationally repre-
sentative survey of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population, collects
medical expenditure data at both the person and household levels. The HC
collects detailed data on demographic characteristics, health conditions, health
status, use of medical care services, charges and payments, access to care, sat-
isfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. The
HC uses an overlapping panel design in which data are collected through a
preliminary contact followed by a series of five rounds of interviews over a
-year period. Using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technol-
ogy, data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar years are collected
from each household. This series of data collection rounds is launched each
subsequent year on a new sample of households to provide overlapping panels
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of survey data and, when combined with other ongoing panels, will provide
continuous and current estimates of health care expenditures. MEPS HC panel
6 covers two years’ data (2001 and 2002) for 21,959 individuals. Since this pa-
per’s main goal is to explore the relationships for the working age individuals,
the sample of individuals whose ages are either below 18 or over 65 is dropped.
Students are out of sample too. After cleaning the sample with the missing
information, 8896 data points are left.
1.4.2 Model specification
In this subsection all the variables in the three simultaneous equations
are described. Table 1.2 provides the definitions.
In order to identify the simultaneous equation models, there have to be
at least as many excluded exogenous variables as endogenous variables in the
equation theoretically (Maddala, 1983). For example, in the health equation,
there are two endogenous variables on the right hand side: employment status
and medical spending since both of them have impacts on individuals’ health.
In order to identify the health equation, we have to find at least two exogenous
variables which don’t appear in the health equation but appear in either labor
force participation equation or medical expenditure equation.
Three endogenous variables are health, employment status and medical
spending. The health measure is the PCS score as mentioned in Section 1.2.
The score ranges from 0 to 100 where 100 corresponds to the highest level of
health. The lowest health level in the current sample is 11.73, the highest is
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67.24 and the mean is 50.07 (Refer Table 1.3 for descriptive statistics). The
employment status takes two values: if the individual is employed, then it is 1,
otherwise it is 0. Medical spending in this paper is individual’s out-of-pocket
spending. It ranges from 0 to 37128 dollars per year and the average is 507
dollars per year.
The common exogenous variables in all three equations are individual’s
age, sex, race, marital status and education level. The appearance of there
variables are standard in the literature.
Additional exogenous variables in the health equation are smoke, phys-
ical activity, seat belt and individuals’ past health. Individuals’ smoking be-
havior and whether they exercise regularly have long been considered to have
direct impacts on health in the literature. Whether individuals wear seat belt
most of the times only affect the health when there are car accidents. Indi-
viduals’ health depend greatly on their preexisting conditions which are their
last period’s health level. They are assumed to have impacts on labor force
participation and medical spending only through their impacts on the current
health level.
Additional exogenous variables in the labor force participation equation
are age square, number of children, whether the individual has children under
5 years old, whether the individual is employed in the last period and spouse’
income. The variables used here are quite standard in the literature of labor
supply.
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Additional exogenous variables in the medical spending equation are
different health insurance types and spouse’ income. The different types of
insurance and spouse’s income only impact the health through their impact
on medical spending. I assume here the different types of health insurance
are uncorrelated with the employment status because unemployed individuals
have access to public insurance such as Medicaid and nowadays, Medicaid has
both HMO and fee for service.
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Table 1.2: Variable definitions:
Endogenous variables
healtht physical component summary index at period t,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
employedt employment status at period t:1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise
medicalt total amount of out-of-pocket medical expenditure
Variables appearing in all the equations
age Individual’s actual age
sex 1 if male, 0 otherwise
race 1 if white, 0 otherwise
mar 1 if married, 0 otherwise
edu 1 if with a college degree, 0 otherwise
Additional variables appearing
in the health equation
smoke 1 if smoke, 0 otherwise
phyact 1 if currently spends half hour or more on moderate to vigorous
physical activities at least three times a week, 0 otherwise
seatbelt wears seat belt whenever drives or rides in a car:
1 if always, 0 otherwise
healtht−1 physical component summary index at period t-1,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
Additional variables appearing
in the labor force participation equation
age2 age2
numchi the actual number of children the individual has
child5 whether the individual has children under 5 years old:
1 if has, 0 otherwise
employedt−1 employment status at period t-1
spousein spouse’ actual income: if no spouse then spousein=0
Additional variables appearing in the medical expenditure equation
hmo the individual’s health insurance type: 1 if hmo, 0 otherwise
gatekeeper the individual’s health insurance type: 1 if gatekeeper,
0 otherwise
ppo the individual’s health insurance type: 1 if ppo, 0 otherwise
spousein spouse’ actual income: if no spouse then spousein=0
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of the sample:
Variables Sample Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Endogenous variables
healtht 50.07 9.39 11.73 67.24
employedt 0.76 0.43 0 1
medicalt 507 1130 0 37128
Variables appearing in all the equations
age 42.27 11.95 19 65
sex 0.46 0.50 0 1
race 0.81 0.39 0 1
mar 0.63 0.48 0 1
edu 0.23 0.42 0 1
Additional variables appearing in the health equation
smoke 0.23 0.42 0 1
phyact 0.55 0.50 0 1
seatbelt 0.77 0.42 0 1
healtht−1 50.11 9.41 13.21 67.13
Additional variables appearing
in the labor force participation equation
numchi 1.08 1.23 0 12
child5 0.20 0.40 0 1
employedt−1 0.75 0.43 0 1
spousein 20372 28647 0 280777
Additional variables appearing
in the medical expenditure equation
hmo 0.38 0.49 0 1
gatekeeper 0.08 0.27 0 1
ppo 0.17 0.38 0 1
spousein 20372 28647 0 280777
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1.5 Estimation results
In this section, the results for the endogenous variables are first pre-
sented in detail and then the results for exogenous variables of different equa-
tions are described briefly. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the estimation results
for all the equations.
Overall, a significant impact of health on labor force participation is
estimated. The positive sign indicates that, other things equal, better health
increases the probability of labor force participation by 9.26%. The feedback
effect of labor force participation on health is significant positive too. Else
equal, the employed individuals are healthier than the unemployed individuals
even after controlling for the last period health. This is probably due to the
emotional stress of the unemployed individuals. We can see that healthier
individuals spend less on their medical care and after controlling for the same
health level, the employed individuals spend less than the unemployed which
is unexpected but the result is not significant.
The most unexpected result is the impact of medical spending on health
in the health equation. Even after correcting the endogeneity problem by two
step procedure, the sign on medical spending is still significant negative. This
result is really telling us something else. Maybe the way we are interpreting
the result is not that appropriate. It is not saying that more medical spending
lead to less health. It is just because we don’t observe the health level of
individuals if they don’t get treated. After they get treated and spend a lot
of money on their medical care, the health levels are highly possible not as
15
high as before. That is why we observe a significant negative sign there. But
the medical spending is contributing to the difference between the unobserved
untreated health and the current health.
Looking at the estimation for the health equation, other than sex, race
and seat belt are not significant, all the other results are quite as expected,
the health decreases as individuals get older. Married and more educated ones
are healthier than otherwise. Smoking is bad for health and excising regularly
has a significant positive impact on health. Individuals who have preexisting
conditions are far less healthy than those who don’t.
For the labor force participation equation, in order to interpret the re-
sults and compare to the OLS results(Appendix 1), the marginal effect of each
variable is calculated. The results are just as expected according to the ex-
isting literature. The probability of labor participation increases with age but
at a reducing speed since age square is negative. Married and more educated
individuals have higher probability of entering the labor force everything else
being equal. If the individual has children under 5 years old or has a spouse
with higher income, then this individual is more likely to exit the labor force.
If the individual is employed last period, then it is highly possible for this
individual to still remain in the labor force. There are also four cross terms
too.
As for the medical expenditure equation, the results are as expected
too. Older ones and whites spend more. Female spend a lot more than male.
It is probably due to pregnancy or cosmetic reasons. More educated ones and
16
Table 1.4: Estimation results:
Variables in the Equations Coefficients Standard error Marginal Effects
Health equation
cons 2.6732 0.2096
employedt 0.2153 0.0249
medicalt/1000 -.5434 0.2063
age/10 -.0917 0.0120
sex 0.0295* 0.0202
race 0.0290* 0.0224
mar 0.0512 0.0160
edu 0.1003 0.0216
smoke -.0650 0.0183
phyact 0.0946 0.0150
seatbelt 0.0275* 0.0176
healtht−1/10 0.4845 0.0387
healtht−1/10medicalt/1000 0.1095 0.0480
R2 0.4687
the ones whose spouses have higher incomes spend more. Most importantly,
we can see that individuals who have hmo health insurance plans spend less
than others.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between health, labor force
participation and medical spending using data form MEPS panel 6. The po-
tential endogeneity problems of these three factors are addressed by estimating
the health equation, labor force participation equation and medical spending
17
Table 1.5: Estimation results(Continued):
Variables in the Equations Coefficients Standard error Marginal Effects
Labor force participation equation
cons -8.1171 0.6819
healtht 0.7177 0.0729 0.0926
age 1.8836 0.2654 0.2431
sex 0.0841* 0.1144 0.0086
race 0.0987* 0.1078 0.0104
mar 0.4429 0.1328 0.0476
edu 0.3206 0.1162 0.0308
age2 -.2423 0.0306 -.0313
numchi -.0946* 0.0780 -.0122
child5 -.5008 0.2563 -.0577
employedt−1 4.2207 0.0862 0.7141
spousein -.0098 0.0017 -.0013
sexnchi 0.2861 0.0868 0.0290
sexchi5 0.3200 0.2795 0.0297
marnchi -.1698* 0.0902 -.0166
marchi5 0.1105* 0.2815 0.0110
R2 0.6554
Medical expenditure equation
cons 1.4103 0.1290
employedt -.0570* 0.0400
healtht -.2916 0.0227
age 0.1248 0.0109
sex -.1562 0.0240
race 0.1935 0.0298
mar -.0747 0.0289
edu 0.2183 0.0291
hmo -.1468 0.0264
gatekeeper -.0490* 0.0447
ppo 0.0507* 0.0340
spousein 0.0017 0.0005
R2 0.0891
No of observations 8896
* not significant at 5% 18
equation in a simultaneous equations model by two step procedure.
Overall, a significant impact of health on labor force participation is es-
timated. The feedback effect of labor force participation on health is significant
positive too. This is probably due to the emotional stress of the unemployed
individuals. We can see that healthier individuals spend less on their medical
care and after controlling for the same health level, the employed individu-
als spend less than the unemployed which is unexpected but the result is not
significant.
There are two potential issues for this kind of reduced form regression:
interpretation and identification.
How do we supposed to interpret the negative sign on medical spending
in the health equation? It is not saying that more medical spending lead to
less health. It is just because we don’t observe the health level of individuals
if they don’t get treated. After they get treated and spend a lot of money on
their medical care, the health levels are highly possible not as high as before.
That is why we observe a significant negative sign there. But the medical
spending is contributing to the difference between the unobserved untreated
health and the current health.
In order to make this simultaneous equations model work and identify
the model, there have to be some reasonable good exogenous excluded vari-
ables. Are those exogenous excluded variables mentioned in Section 1.4.2 good
enough? There is always plenty of criticism against those variables being used
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as instruments. But because of the data limitation, those variables are the
best the author could find in this data set.
Because of the issues mentioned above, the author calls for a structural
model of this kind of relationship which can model individuals preference and
behavior, technology and market structure.
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Chapter 2
A Medical Expenditure Puzzle
What does your medical care do to your health? Researchers often
find a significant negative coefficient on medical expenditure in reduced form
health production regressions. The puzzling result motivates this dynamic
heterogeneous agent model to study the relationships between health status,
medical expenditure and employment. In this model, individuals value both
consumption and health and they are heterogeneous in their health levels and
employment status. Individuals choose how much to spend on medical care
and consumption. Health can be accumulated from investment in medical care
and this increases both job opportunities and quality of life. The structural pa-
rameters are estimated by an indirect inference procedure which matches the
simulated regression coefficients to the data regression coefficients from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. This paper finds that the simulated coef-
ficient of medical expenditure in the health equation is negative even though
in the health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure
impacts the health in the positive way. This paper also explains the basis for
this result.
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2.1 Introduction
What does your medical care do to your health? People would respond
very naturally that of course it will improve health. Else, there is just no
point of spending any money on medical care. However, researchers often
get a significant negative coefficient on medical expenditure in reduced form
health production regressions. Researchers attribute this to the correlation
between medical expenditure and something in the error term which causes a
downward bias. What is that something in the error term and why can that
something cause the downward bias? This puzzling result motivates this paper
to investigate the role of medical expenditure in improving health. This paper
explains why we have this puzzling result in reduce form regressions while at
the same time medical spending impacts the health in the positive way.
Medical expenditure has been suggested to be viewed as one form of hu-
man capital decades ago (Mushkin 1962, pp. 129-49; Becker 1964, pp. 33-36;
Fuchs 1966, pp. 90-91).1 Grossman (1972) is the first to construct a life cycle
model of the demand for health capital itself. In his model, health is viewed
as a capital stock which yields an output of “healthy days”. Individuals may
invest in health by combining time (e.g., for doctor’s visits) with purchased
inputs (e.g., medical services). The incentive for investing in health is that by
increasing the health stock the individual increases the amount of time avail-
able for earning income or for producing consumption goods. One prediction
1Quoted from Grossman 1972.
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of the model is that if the health depreciation rate increases with age, at least
after some point in the life cycle, then the quantity of health demanded would
decline over the life cycle. This prediction relies crucially on the assumption
that consumers fully anticipate intertemporal variations in depreciation rates
and therefore, know their age of death with certainty. At the same time, pro-
vided the elasticity of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule were less than
unity, expenditures on medical care would rise with age. As a result, under
certain conditions, health demanded and medical care demanded could go in
the opposite direction.
Grossman (1972b) then runs a reduced form regression on health pro-
duction function and finds that the coefficient on medical expenditure is sig-
nificant negative. He explains this as a result of the correlation between the
medical expenditure and the error term (health depreciation rate). The cor-
relation causes a downward bias and hence, the coefficient could be negative.
The explanation is not quite satisfactory because age is already one of the
independent variables in that regression. However, according to Grossman
(1972a), health depreciation rate only varies with age. Furthermore, even af-
ter controlling age and initial health, the coefficient on medical expenditure in
the health production function is still negative based on the empirical work in
this paper.
In order to correct the wrong sign on medical expenditure, a lot of
labor and health economists have devoted enormous amount of efforts to find
the right data set and right instruments to a certain group of individuals.
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Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983, 1988, 1991) and Grossman and Joyce(1990)
consider the effects of some health inputs such as mother’s prenatal care and
smoking behavior on baby’s health. They use baby’s weight as a measure
of baby’s health and use income, education and price of medical care service
as instruments for medical care. They get the consistent estimates though
the validity of baby’s weight as an instrument for baby’s health has been
questioned.
Instead of spending all the efforts on searching for the good instruments
and trying to correct the sign as the most researchers do, this paper studies
the role of medical expenditure in improving health in a heterogeneous agent
model. In this model, individuals value both consumption and health and
they are heterogeneous in their health levels and employment status. Individ-
uals choose how much to spend on medical care and consumption. Health can
be accumulated from investment in medical care and this increases both job
opportunities and quality of life. The structural parameters are estimated by
an indirect inference procedure which matches the simulated regression coeffi-
cients to the data regression coefficients from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey. This paper finds that the simulated coefficient of medical expenditure
in the health equation is negative even though in the health evolution equation
of the structural model, medical care impacts the health in the positive way.
The reason why this paper has this result is because there are two roles
played by medical care in improving health. One is “curing” role and the
other is “improvement” role. The “curing” role captures the medical care of
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recovery from a sudden drop of health level(i.e. acute disease or accidents) and
the “improvement” role captures the care from individuals’ investment motive.
In a cross section reduced form estimation of health production function, if
the effect of “curing” dominates the effect of “improvement”, the coefficient
on medical expenditure will be negative. Hence, the gain of medical care is
often hidden in reduced form regressions. However, with the structural model
in this paper, people can see clearly how medical care improve health in the
health evolution equation.
There are papers which incorporate medical expenditure risks into ex-
plaining individuals’ savings, insurance choices, bankruptcy filing, retirement
decision and probably more. The saving literature includes Kotlikoff (1989),
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994, 1995), Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi,
French and Jones (2005). Kotlikoff (1989) examines the effects of different fi-
nancing mechanisms for random health expenditures on macroeconomic saving
rates. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes build a life-cycle model that incorporates
uncertainty regarding annual earnings, medical expenses and longevity to ex-
plain the distribution of wealth holdings in the U.S. (their 1994 paper) and to
study the consequences of a resource-tested Medicaid program for saving deci-
sions by low- and middle-income families (their 1995 paper). Palumbo (1999)
and De Nardi, French and Jones (2005) incorporate medical expenditure risks
to study savings of the elderly. Jeske and Kitao (2005) work on the income tax
policy with health insurance choice in a general equilibrium framework. Chat-
terjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2005) takes into account the unpaid
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heath-care bills for the bankruptcy filing decisions. Rust and Phelan (1997)
and Blau and Gilleskie (2005) look into the association between retiree health
insurance and employment of older individuals with medical expenditure risks
in the model.
However, all the research mentioned above take medical expenditure
risks as exogenously given instead of as endogenous choice. As a result, med-
ical expenditure can only take the “curing” role to restore the health to its
original level in the papers mentioned above. This paper is among the first
to endogenize both medical expenditure choices and individuals’ health levels.
Hall and Jones (2006) argues that the rise in health spending over the years is
a rational response to the growth of income since the elasticity of health spend-
ing to income is above one. That paper concentrates on the role of medical
expenditure to improve health at aggregate level (i.e. solving a social planner’s
problem) and therefore, health in that model is the inverse of mortality rate.
The rise of medical care investment of the nation decreases mortality rate and
increases average life span which drive the elasticity of total health spending to
total income above one. My paper investigates the role of medical spending to
improve individuals’ health levels and in turn, how health impacts individuals’
job opportunities and quality of life. It is rich enough to incorporate social
insurance and at the same time, provides room for policy experiments.
This paper has the following contributions. First, it looks deeply into
the role of medical spending in improving individuals’ health in a structural
model and therefore, it can explain the puzzling result in reduced form re-
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gressions. Second, it provides a quantitative model in which individuals value
both their consumption and health and at the same time, health can be ac-
cumulated through medical care investment. Third, it pins down the weight
between consumption and health in individuals’ preference and the parameters
in the structural health production function. Last, by estimating the struc-
tural parameters with indirect inference procedure, it bridges reduced form
regressions with the structural estimation.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the model parameterization strategy and the data.
Section 4 presents the estimation results and the analysis. Section 5 concludes
the paper and discusses the future work.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
This paper considers a dynamic quantitative model with heterogeneous
agents. The various components of the theoretical model are described below.
2.2.1 Preference and Health Production Function
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals who are ex
ante heterogeneous with respect to their health status and employment sta-
tus. The agents in this economy are infinite-lived and maximize the following
expected value of their discounted utility:
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, ht) (2.1)
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where ct is consumption, ht is health stock, β is the discount factor and 0 <
β < 1, U(·, ·) is the momentary utility function.
In this simple model, agents can’t save. Savings will be incorporated
into one of the possible extensions of this paper. Their budget constraint is
given by
ct = y
d
t −mt (2.2)
where ct is the consumption in the current period, y
d
t is the disposable income
in the current period and mt is the individual’s out-of-pocket medical care
expense in the current period.
Agents’ health stock evolves according to the following equation:
ht+1 = φt(1− δ)ht + a(mt)b (2.3)
where ht is the health stock at the beginning of the current period, δ is the
health depreciation rate, φt is the health shock at the beginning of the current
period, a and b are parameters and ht+1 is the health stock at the beginning of
the next period. For the ease of later analysis , the medical expenses incurred
to restore the health back up to its starting level in the period because of a bad
health shock are referred as medical expenses for “curing” purpose and other
medical expenses are referred as medical expenses for “investment” purpose.
The health shock φt is an i.i.d. shock which takes two values φ ∈ Φ =
{φg, φb}2.
2φg is no shock in this model and φb is bad shock, i.e. a car accident or a broken leg.
φg = 1 and φb = 1− z.
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2.2.2 Job Opportunities and Markov Transition Function
In each period of their lives, agents face a stochastic employment op-
portunity. Let s denote the employment state of an individual. If s = e,
the agent is employed and if s = u, the agent is unemployed. Conditional on
agents’ employment status last period and health stock at the beginning of this
period, the employment probabilities in this period are denoted by pi(e′|e, h′),
pi(u′|e, h′), pi(u′|u, h′) and pi(e′|u, h′). pi(e′|e, h′) and pi(e′|u, h′) are estimated
by Nadaraya Watson nonparametric regression3 from the MEPS data (Figure
1). pi(u′|e, h′) and pi(u′|u, h′) are just 1− pi(e′|e, h′) and 1− pi(e′|u, h′) respec-
tively. Given a particular value of h′, employment status transitions follow a
two state markov process.
Figure 3.1 shows the employment probabilities this period conditional
on whether the individual is employed (top) or unemployed (bottom) last
period and their health status. The vertical axis is the estimated employment
probabilities and the horizontal axis is the actual health stock divided by 100.
The lowest health level is 11.73 and the highest level is 67.24 in the MEPS
data (see Table 2). The probabilities are continuous in h′. From the graphs,
we can see that everything else being equal, a healthier agent has a higher
chance of getting the job and the agent who had a job last period has a better
chance of being employed this period.
In MEPS, employment status is surveyed every half a year but medical
3Adrian Pagan and Aman Ullah (1999), Nonparametric Economics, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
29
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.974
0.976
0.978
0.98
0.982
0.984
0.986
0.988
0.99
0.992
transiton probability for the employed
health stock
pro
ba
bil
ity
 of
 re
ma
ini
ng
 em
plo
ye
d n
ex
t p
eri
od
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
transition probability for the unemployed
health stock
pro
ba
bil
ity
 of
 ge
ttin
g e
mp
loy
ed
 ne
xt 
pe
rio
d
Figure 2.1: The employment transition probabilities for employed and unem-
ployed individuals
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expenditure is the expenditure accumulated within one year. In order to create
yearly data, the individual is assumed to be employed as long as he is employed
in either half of the year. This will result in an underestimate of the impact of
health status on individual’s employment status and increase the persistence
of employment status in the top graph of Figure 3.1. It would be better if we
have monthly or quarterly data in order to estimate these transition functions
more accurately. However, it won’t have a big impact on the robustness of the
structural parameter estimates later on since the same sort of bias applies to
the reduced form data regression.
If the agent is employed, his disposable income is y − τ , where y is his
income and τ is the income tax he has to pay. If the agent is unemployed, his
disposable income is just his unemployment insurance from the government
θy, where θ is the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance.
Let η denotes the employment status of the agent. If the agent is
employed, η = 1, otherwise η = 1.
2.2.3 Timing and Defining Maximization Problem
The timing of the model is the following: The agent enters period t with
a health stock of ht and then his employment status is revealed. Then a health
shock φt is realized. After observing his health shock, the agent chooses mt
either to recover from a bad shock and/or improve his health. Then he enters
period t+1 with a health stock of ht+1 which evolves according to equation
(3.3).
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The maximization problem can be written as a dynamic programming
problem. Note that the state variable are health stock h, employment oppor-
tunity s and health shock φ. The dynamic programming problem is:
V (φ, e, h) = max
m
u[y(1− τ)−m,h] + β
∑
φ′
χ(φ′|φ)
∑
s′
pi(s′|e, h′)V (φ′, s′, h′)
V (φ, u, h) = max
m
u[θy −m,h] + β
∑
φ′
χ(φ′|φ)
∑
s′
pi(s′|u, h′)V (φ′, s′, h′)
subject to
m ≥ 0 (2.4)
2.3 Parameterizations
This section first describes how those parameter values in the theo-
retical model are chosen and what parameters need to be estimated. Then
it presents the steps of this indirect inference estimation strategy. The data
used in the estimation is described in the third subsection. A descriptive model
which is the basis for this indirect inference procedure is then formulated at
the end of this section.
2.3.1 Parameters in the Structural Model
The utility function used in the computation has the following form:
U(c, h) =
(c1−σhσ)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ (2.5)
where 0 ≤ σ < 1 and ρ > 0 guarantee that uc > 0, uh > 0, ucc < 0 and uhh < 0
but the sign of uch depends on whether ρ is greater or less than 1.
32
The time period in the model is one year. The health stock is set
between 0 and 1 to match the data. β is set to 0.95. δ is the health depreciation
rate in the health evolution equation. δ is set to 0.01 based on the following
calculation. The lowest health level in the data is 11.73 and the highest is
67.24. This paper assumes that human beings can live up to 150 years if
without any accident or illness. Then, 67.24(1 − δ)150 = 11.73. This gives us
the value of δ. If this paper assumes that human beings can live up to 100
years without any accident or illness, δ is calculated to be 0.017. This does
not affect the main results of this paper.
The wage rate y is normalized to 1. This paper takes policy parameters
θ and τ as exogenous. θ is set to 0.25 for the following reason. The U.I.
replacement ratio in the United States is about 0.5 which usually lasts for six
months. Since the unemployment duration in this model is assumed to be 1
year so the U.I. replacement ratio is set to be 0.25 in this paper and τ is set
to 0.15 which is the average federal tax rate in the United States.
The parameters need to be estimated by Indirect Inference are Θ =
{σ ρ a b z}. σ and ρ are preference parameters. a and b are parameters in the
health stock evolution equation. z is the health shock parameter.
2.3.2 Indirect Inference
The structural model parameters are estimated using the method of
indirect inference. For arbitrary values of the vector of parameters Θ, the
dynamic programming problem is solved and policy functions are generated.
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Using these policy functions, the decision rule is simulated to create a simu-
lated version of the data to match. One then chooses a descriptive statistical
model that provides a rich description of the patterns of covariation in the
data. Such a descriptive model can be estimated on both the simulated data
from the structural model, and on the actual observed data. This then gives
us two sets of coefficients to match, Ψs(Θ) and Ψd.
The estimate Θˆ is pinned down by minimizing the weighted distance
between the actual and simulated coefficients from the descriptive models.
Formally, it solves
£(Θ) = min
Θ
[Ψd −Ψs(Θ)]′W [Ψd −Ψs(Θ)] (2.6)
where W is a weighting matrix. The method of indirect inference will generate
a consistent estimate of θ. The weighting matrix,W, is constructed as the
inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients estimated from
the MEPS.
Since the Ψs(Θ) function is not analytically tractable, the minimization
is performed using numerical techniques. A simulated annealing algorithm is
used to perform the optimization in order to obtain the global minimum in
parameter space independent of starting values.
2.3.3 The Data
The data used for this paper come from the Household Component
of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The MEPS HC is a nationally
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representative survey of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. It
collects medical expenditure data at both the person and household levels.
The HC collects detailed data on demographic characteristics, health condi-
tions, health status, use of medical care services, charges and payments, access
to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employ-
ment. The HC uses an overlapping panel design in which data are collected
through a preliminary contact followed by a series of five rounds of interviews
over a -year period. Using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI)
technology, data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar years are
collected from each household. This series of data collection rounds is launched
each subsequent year on a new sample of households to provide overlapping
panels of survey data and, when combined with other ongoing panels, will
provide continuous and current estimates of health care expenditures. MEPS
HC panel 6 covers two years’ data (2001 and 2002) for 21,959 individuals.
Since this paper’s main goal is to explore the relationships for the working age
individuals, the sample of individuals whose ages are either below 19 or over
64 is dropped. Students are out of sample too. After cleaning the sample by
deleting the observations with missing information, 7515 data points are left.
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2.3.4 Descriptive Model
The descriptive model consists of two linear equations which are exten-
sively estimated in the literature of health economics.4 These equations are
health equation and medical expenditure equation. They take the following
forms:
ht+1 = α1mt + α2ht + α3htmt +X1α4 + ε1t
mt = γ1ht + γ2st +X2γ3 + ε2t (2.7)
where h is individual’s health, s is individual’s employment status and m
is individual’s out-of-pocket medical expenditure.5 X1 and X2 are control
variables in these equations. Since these control variables are not modeled in
the structural model, it is assumed that the agents in the structural model are
homogenous in them. The MEPS coefficients which are going be matched by
the simulated coefficients are {α1 α2 α3 γ1 γ2}. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide the
definitions and the summary statistics of all the variables in these equations.
In the health equation, medical expenditure is expected to have a pos-
itive effect on health but the coefficient in the OLS regression is usually neg-
ative. Last period health is expected to have a positive effect on this period
health.
4Currie and Madrian (1999) has a detailed review of them. Stratmann (1999) estimates
the effect of doctor visits on work day loss using the types of health insurance as instruments
for doctor visits.
5Here, out-of-pocket medical expenditure is in the form of the percentage of income in
order to match the simulated data from the structural model. In order to use the medical
expenditure share, the individuals without any income or with the medical expenditure
share greater than 1 are out of sample.
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In the medical expenditure equation, conditional on the same employed
status, healthier individuals are expected to spend less on their medical bill
and therefore, the coefficients is expected to be negative. Conditional on the
same health level, the employed individuals are expected to spend more on
their medical care and therefore the coefficient is expected to be positive but
in the reduced form regressions, the coefficient is significantly negative.
The coefficients on the control variables in the two equations all have
their expected signs. These two equations are estimated separately by OLS
regression. The results are reported in Table 2.3. According to the OLS
results,
Ψd = {−0.4249 0.5325 0.5508 − 0.0915 − 0.0440}.
2.4 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure described in the previous section gives us
the following results of the structural parameters and the coefficients from the
simulated data:
From Table 2.5, we can see that the simulated coefficients match the
MEPS coefficients quite well. Interestingly, the simulated α1, the coefficient
of medical expenditure in the health equation, is negative even though in the
health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure only
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Table 2.1: Variable definitions:
Dependent variables
healtht+1 physical component summary index* at the end of period t,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
medicalt total amount of out-of-pocket medical expenditure
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age Individual’s actual age
sex 1 if male, 0 otherwise
race 1 if white, 0 otherwise
mar 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Additional independent variables appearing
in the health equation
healtht physical component summary index at the end of period t-1,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
Additional independent variables appearing
in the medical expenditure equation
employedt employment status at period t: 1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise
inscov whether the individual has health insurance coverage: 1 if yes,
0 otherwise
*Refer Appendix 1 for the description of health measure used in this paper.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the sample:
Variables Sample Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
healtht+1/100 0.51 0.08 0.1173 0.6724
medicalt/incomet 0.02 0.06 0 0.9983
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age/100 0.41 0.11 0.19 0.64
sex 0.49 0.50 0 1
race 0.81 0.39 0 1
mar 0.62 0.49 0 1
Additional independent variables appearing in the health equation
healtht/100 0.51 0.09 0.1321 0.6713
Additional independent variables appearing
in the medical expenditure equation
employedt 0.94 0.23 0 1
inscov 0.85 0.36 0 1
39
Table 2.3: Estimation results of OLS estimation
Variables in The Equations Coefficients Standard Error
Health equation
cons 0.2646 0.0066
medicalt/incomet -.4249 0.053
healtht/100 0.5325 0.0103
(healtht/100)(medicalt/incomet) 0.5508 0.1139
age/100 -.0735 0.0070
sex 0.0047 0.0016
race 0.0028* 0.0020
mar 0.0042 0.0016
R2 0.3962
Medical expenditure equation
cons 0.1043 0.0061
healtht/100 -.0915 0.0087
employedt -.0440 0.0032
age/100 0.0544 0.0064
sex -.0146 0.0014
race 0.0053 0.0018
mar -.0039 0.0015
inscov -.0125 0.0020
R2 0.0912
No of observations 7515
*the coefficient is not significant at 5 percent significant level.
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Table 2.4: Structural Parameter Estimates:
σ ρ a b z
Estimated V alue 0.0518 1.5321 0.5702 0.3746 0.3333
Standard Error 0.0007 0.0040 0.0020 0.0005 0.0006
Table 2.5: Coefficients and Moments from the MEPS and Simulated Data:
α1 α2 α3 γ1 γ2 £(Θ)
MEPS -0.4249 0.5325 0.5508 -0.0915 -0.044
Simulated -0.4739 0.5208 0.606 -0.0251 -0.0652 45
impacts the health in the positive way because parameters a and b are both
positive.
Why is the estimated α1 negative? In the simulated reduced form
health production function regression, health level at period t is controlled
for. Hence, I only need to analyze the individuals with the same health level
at period t. The medical expenses of these individuals differ because of the
realization of health shocks and employment status. There are two forces which
impact the sign of the coefficient on medical expenditure in the simulated
reduced form health production regression.
On the one hand, for the individuals with the same starting health and
the same employment status, some get no health shock and some get a bad
health shock. Furthermore, health will depreciate even if no health shock is
realized. The individuals with no health shock might spend money on medical
care for investment purpose. The individuals with bad health shock have to
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spend money on medical care to cure themselves first and then invest. As a
result, even though the individuals with the bad health shock might spend
much more money than the individuals with no adverse health shock, the
health outcome could be much lower depending both on the size of the bad
shock and the parameters in health evolution function. This gives us the result
of more medical spending but with worse health outcome. The bad health
shock is the key element to this negative coefficient on medical expenditure.
On the other hand, individuals in this model differ from each other
because their employment status and therefore, their income level too. The
income dimension coincides with the employment dimension in this model since
the heterogeneity of income solely comes from the heterogeneity of employment
status. Let us compare the employed individuals with no health shock and the
unemployed individuals with bad health shock with the same starting health
level. Unemployed individuals have much tighter constraints than employed
individuals and they have to balance their resources between consumption and
medical care. If the starting health level is low, even if the employed have a bad
health shock, their medical spending might be less than the medical spending
of the employed. That will give us the result of more medical spending with
better health outcome.
As a result, depending on the structural parameters and composition of
the sample, the coefficient on medical expenditure in the reduced form health
production regression could either be positive or negative. The reason why we
have the negative coefficient is because the medical expenditure for “curing”
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purpose dominates the medical expenditure for “investment” purpose.
The analysis above is tested by the following experiment. The de-
scriptive model regressions are redone controlling for the health shock in the
health production function. If the analysis above is true, then the coefficient
on medical expenditure in the health production function regression should be
positive after controlling for the health shock while the coefficient on health
shock should be negative. The experiment results are presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Coefficients from the MEPS Data and Coefficients from the Simu-
lated Data without and with Controlling for Health Shocks:
α1 α2 α3 α4
MEPS -0.4249 0.5325 0.5508 NA
Simulated No Control -0.4739 0.5208 0.606 NA
Simulated Control 0.3182 0.5458 0.1478 -0.1446
As described in last section, α1, α2 and α3 are the coefficients on med-
ical expenditure, previous health and the cross term of these two respectively
in the health equation. MEPS and Simulated No Control present the es-
timation results of the above two regressions by using the MEPS data and
the simulated data respectively. Simulated Control presents the estimation
results of the above two regressions but with healthshock as one of the inde-
pendent variable in the health equation by using the simulated data. Indeed,
the coefficient on medical expenditure in the health equation becomes positive
in the above experiment. At the same time, the coefficient on health shock,
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α4, in the health equation is negative. The reason why researchers often get
a significantly negative coefficient on medical expenditure in the OLS health
production regression is because they don’t observe health shocks in the real
data.
The fact that the simulated coefficients match the data coefficients
quite well reflects that the theoretical model is reasonably specified and there
exists a set of structural parameters which make simulated individuals’ choices
mimic individuals’ choices in reality.
From a statistical perspective, the model is rejected since the reported
values of £(Θ) are still high compare to the cut off value. However, in this set-
ting, this reflects the fact that the coefficients are calculated from a very large
panel data set, implying very small standard deviations of the coefficients (and
a very large W). Given how precisely the micro coefficients are estimated from
the actual data, virtually any model would be formally rejected with even very
modest deviations of the simulated coefficients from the actual coefficients. As
we have emphasized above, the fit of the model in the last line of Table 2.5
is actually quite good in terms of matching the data coefficients on both a
qualitative and quantitative basis.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by a “medical expenditure puzzle”. Instead
of trying to correct the sign of the coefficient on medical expenditure in the
reduced form health production function, this paper studies individuals’ choice
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of medical expenditure and how their medical care affect their health and in
turn their job opportunities and quality of life in a dynamic heterogeneous
agent model. Through this study, we can see clearly how the medical care
impacts individuals’ health and what factors determine how much individuals
are going to spend on their medical care.
The structural parameters are estimated by the method of Indirect
Inference which minimizes the distance function of the MEPS coefficients and
the simulated coefficients. The idea of this indirect inference procedure is that
if the model is correctly specified, the coefficients from the simulated data
regressions should have the same direction and degree of bias as the coefficients
from the MEPS data regressions. This is the first study to estimate the weight
and risk averse parameters in a CRRA utility function with both consumption
and health and at the same time, estimate the health production function.
This paper finds that the simulated coefficient of medical expenditure in
the health equation is negative even though in the health evolution equation
of the structural model, medical expenditure impacts health in the positive
way. The reason why we have the negative coefficient is because the medi-
cal expenditure for “curing” purpose dominates the medical expenditure for
“investment” purpose. This study suggests that reduced form regression re-
sults sometimes give us the wrong information without knowing the structural
model behind it. Furthermore, it is much easier to see agents’ behavior and
the causalities of key variables in the structural model. The structural model
also provides room for policy experiments which will be the natural extensions
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of this paper.
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Chapter 3
Measuring the Welfare Cost of Mandatory
Employer-provided Health Insurance
Empirically, 83 percent of the 45 million uninsured in the United States
are in working families. As a result, mandatory employer-provided health
insurance has been one of the hotly debated policies in order to reduce the
portion of the uninsured. However, whether this mandate is economically
justified remains an open question.
There are two possible effects of this mandate. On the one hand, em-
ployees might choose to be uninsured if they are relatively healthy and hence
do not value health insurance. After the mandate, these employees could be
worse off. On the other hand, uninsured employees tend to receive less ther-
apeutic care when facing accidents or diseases. This might drive them out
of labor force which imposes a cost to society in terms of both a loss of tax
income and increased burden to welfare program. In that case, society could
become better off because of this mandate.
This paper concentrates on measuring the welfare cost of this mandate
in a dynamic heterogeneous agent model. In this model, individuals value both
consumption and health and they are heterogeneous in their health levels and
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employment status. Individuals choose whether to have health insurance or
not and how much to spend on medical care and consumption. Health can
be accumulated from investment in medical care and this increases both job
opportunities and quality of life. The structural parameters are estimated
by an indirect inference procedure which matches the simulated regression
coefficients to the data regression coefficients from the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey. With the structural parameters being estimated, this paper
then compares the welfare of the working-aged individuals before and after
the mandate. It finds a welfare cost of 0.7 percent of GDP.
3.1 Introduction
There are about 45 million uninsured individuals in the United States.
83 percent of the uninsured are in a family with a worker (Fronstin, 2004). As
a result, the mandatory employer-provided health insurance has been one of
the hotly debated policies in order to reduce the portion of the uninsured.
The policy has been proposed by Clinton administration but in vain in
early 1990s. The objective of ensuring adequate health care for everyone in
society is admirable, and the proposal for mandatory, employer-provided insur-
ance is well-intentioned. However, it is quite possible that federally-mandated
but privately-financed health insurance would actually harm its intended ben-
eficiaries. People could become uninsured because they don’t value health
insurance and hence choose to work in the firm without health insurance but
with higher salary or choose to decline the health insurance coverage when of-
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fered in exchange for a higher salary. After the mandate, firms will eventually
transfer the cost of health insurance provision back to their workers to make
even. Indeed, Gruber and Krueger (1990) finds that 86.5 percent of the cost
of mandated health insurance may be shifted to the worker, primarily in the
form of lower money wages, using evidence from state workers’ compensation
insurance.
On the other hand, uninsured employees tend to receive less therapeutic
care when facing accidents or diseases. This might drive them out of labor
force which imposes a cost to society in terms of both a loss of tax income
and increased burden to welfare program. In that case, society could become
better off because of this mandate.
This paper concentrates on measuring the cost of mandatory employer-
provided health insurance policy by comparing the welfare of the working
aged individuals with and without this policy. It finds that there is a welfare
cost 0.7 percent of GDP associated with this mandate. This paper allows
the individuals to choose their own medical expenses to improve their health
status and in turn increase their job opportunities when facing the unexpected
health shocks in a dynamic heterogenous agent model. In this model, they
also have health insurance choice according to their own characteristics. The
structural parameters in the model are estimated by matching the model’s
implications with individual observations from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) as part of a minimum distance estimation routine.
This paper is the first to endoginize individuals’ health status and there-
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fore health insurance and medical expense choices in a dynamic heterogeneous
agent model. This paper bridges the reduced form regression with structural
estimation by Indirect Inference procedure. It successfully estimates the pref-
erence parameters of the structural model with endoginized health and the
parameters of the health production function which usually has the wrong
sign problem in the reduced form regression (Han 2005).
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides some history of the
employer-provided health insurance. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
outlines the theoretical model. Section 5 describes the model parameterization
strategy and presents the estimation results. Section 6 presents the policy
experiment. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses the future work.
3.2 History of the Employer Provision of Health Insur-
ance
During the late 1800s, companies in the railroad, mining, lumber, and
other industries began hiring company doctors (Institute of Medicine, 1993).
Employers in these industries provided company doctors funded by deduc-
tions from workers’ wages. The employees in these industries often worked in
isolated areas where replacement workers were difficult to find, and the com-
pany self-interest in returning injured or sick workers to full health in such
circumstances is self-evident.
During the World War II, many employers began to offer health benefits
to get around the wage controls set by the National War Labor Board in order
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to attract scarce workers. As a result, the number of persons with employment-
based health benefits started to increase. In 1943, the National War Labor
Board ruled that employer contributions to insurance did not count as wages,
and, thus, did not increase taxable income. Historians often suggest that the
tax-preferred status of employment-based health benefits let to the rise in its
prevalence and comprehensiveness (Fronstin, 2006). More than 159 million
individuals under age 65 had some form of employment-based health benefits
during 2004 (Fronstin, 2005).
For the unemployed, an mix of other institutions has been developed
to ”fill-in-the-gaps”: Medicare for those over 65 (the ”retired”) and the per-
manently disabled; Medicaid for children in lower income families and women
who are on welfare; a small non-group private insurance market for the self-
employed or individuals otherwise lacking insurance; and other miscellaneous
programs such as university-provided health insurance for students who are
no longer dependents of their parents(Currie and Madrian, 1999).
In 2003, out of 252.7 millions nonelderly Americans, the percentage
covered by employment-based health benefits is 63 percent (159.2 millions).
The percentage of individually purchased health insurance is 6.7 percent (17
millions). The percentage covered by public programs is 16.8 percent(42.5
millions). 17.7 percent of nonelderly Americans (44.7 millions) has no health
insurance coverage. While public programs, such as Medicare and Medi-
caid, have been aimed at those farthest from the reach of employment-based
coverage-particularly the elderly, disabled, and families with no or very low in-
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come, the problem of the uninsured is closely tied to the work place. About 83
percent of the 44.7 million uninsured are in a family with a worker (Fronstin,
2004). As a result, the mandatory employer-provided health insurance has
been a hotly debated policy in order to reduce the portion of the uninsured.
3.3 The Data
The data used for this paper come from the Household Component of
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The MEPS HC is a nationally repre-
sentative survey of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population, collects
medical expenditure data at both the person and household levels. The HC
collects detailed data on demographic characteristics, health conditions, health
status, use of medical care services, charges and payments, access to care, sat-
isfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. The
HC uses an overlapping panel design in which data are collected through a
preliminary contact followed by a series of five rounds of interviews over a
-year period. Using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technol-
ogy, data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar years are collected
from each household. This series of data collection rounds is launched each
subsequent year on a new sample of households to provide overlapping panels
of survey data and, when combined with other ongoing panels, will provide
continuous and current estimates of health care expenditures. MEPS HC panel
6 covers two years’ data (2001 and 2002) for 21,959 individuals. Since this pa-
per’s main goal is to explore the relationships for the working age individuals,
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the sample of individuals whose ages are either below 19 or over 64 is dropped.
Students are out of sample too. After cleaning the sample with the missing
information, 7515 data points are left.
3.4 The Theoretical Model
This paper considers a dynamic quantitative model with heterogeneous
agents. The various components of the theoretical model are described below.
3.4.1 Preference and Health Production Function
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals who are ex
ante heterogeneous with respect to their health status and employment sta-
tus. The agents in this economy are infinite-lived and maximize the following
expected value of their discounted utility:
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, ht) (3.1)
where ct is consumption, ht is health stock, β is the discount factor and 0 <
β < 1, U(·, ·) is the momentary utility function.
In this simple model, agents can’t save. Savings will be incorporated
into one of the possible extensions of this paper. Their budget constraint is
given by
ct = y
d
t −mot (3.2)
where ct is the consumption in the current period, y
d
t is the disposable income
in the current period and mot is the individual’s out-of-pocket medical care
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expense in the current period.
Agents’ health stock evolves according to the following equation:
ht+1 = φt(1− δ)ht + a(mt)b (3.3)
where ht is the health stock at the beginning of the current period, δ is the
health depreciation rate, φt is the health shock at the beginning of the current
period, mt is the total medical care expense incurred in the current period,
a and b are parameters and ht+1 is the health stock at the beginning of the
next period. For the ease of later analysis , the medical expenses incurred to
restore the health back up to its starting level in the period because of a bad
health shock are referred as medical expenses for “curing” purpose and other
medical expenses are referred as medical expenses for “investment” purpose.
The relationship between the individual’s out-of-pocket medical care
expense and the total medical care expense is given by the following equations.
If the individual is insured
mot = αmt
and if the individual is uninsured
mot = mt (3.4)
where α is the co-insurance rate of the health insurance for the individual,
which is just the portion of the medical bill the individual has to pay.
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The health shock φt is an i.i.d. shock which takes two values φ ∈ Φ =
{φg, φb}1.
3.4.2 Job Opportunities and Markov Transition Function
In each period of their lives, agents face a stochastic employment op-
portunity. Let s denote the employment state of an individual. If s = e,
the agent is employed and if s = u, the agent is unemployed. Conditional on
agents’ employment status last period and health stock at the beginning of this
period, the employment probabilities in this period are denoted by pi(e′|e, h′),
pi(u′|e, h′), pi(u′|u, h′) and pi(e′|u, h′). pi(e′|e, h′) and pi(e′|u, h′) are estimated
by Nadaraya Watson nonparametric regression2 from the MEPS data (Figure
1). pi(u′|e, h′) and pi(u′|u, h′) are just 1− pi(e′|e, h′) and 1− pi(e′|u, h′) respec-
tively. Given a particular value of h′, employment status transitions follow a
two state markov process.
Figure 3.1 shows the employment probabilities this period conditional
on whether the individual is employed (top) or unemployed (bottom) last
period and their health status. The vertical axis is the estimated employment
probabilities and the horizontal axis is the actual health stock divided by 100.
The lowest health level is 11.73 and the highest level is 67.24 in the MEPS
data (see Table 2). The probabilities are continuous in h′. From the graphs,
1φg is no shock in this model and φb is bad shock, i.e. a car accident or a broken leg.
φg = 1 and φb = 1− z.
2Adrian Pagan and Aman Ullah (1999), Nonparametric Economics, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
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Figure 3.1: The employment transition probabilities for employed and unem-
ployed individuals
56
we can see that everything else being equal, a healthier agent has a higher
chance of getting the job and the agent who had a job last period has a better
chance of being employed this period.
In MEPS, employment status is surveyed every half a year but medical
expenditure is the expenditure accumulated within one year. In order to create
yearly data, the individual is assumed to be employed as long as he is employed
in either half of the year. This will result in an underestimate of the impact of
health status on individual’s employment status and increase the persistence
of employment status in the top graph of Figure 3.1. It would be better if we
have monthly or quarterly data in order to estimate these transition functions
more accurately. However, it won’t have a big impact on the robustness of the
structural parameter estimates later on since the same sort of bias applies to
the reduced form data regression.
3.4.3 Health Insurance Choice
Compensating wage theory predicts that workers receiving more gener-
ous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer
fewer fringe benefits. In this paper, there are two compensation packages
available to the employed individual(with health insurance or without). If the
worker chooses the package with health insurance, his annual income is yc, and
he pays the health insurance premium of pe. As a result, his disposable income
is yc(1− τ − pe), where τ is the income tax he has to pay. This paper assumes
that employee portion of health insurance premium is not tax deductible in
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the benchmark model. If the worker chooses the package without health in-
surance, his annual income is yc + R. As a result, his disposable income is
(yc + R)(1 − τ). R is the wage differential between the packages with and
without health insurance.
If the agent is unemployed, his disposable income is just θy, where θ is
the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance and y is the mean wage of
the employed individuals. This paper assumes that unemployed individuals all
have health insurance provided by some government program for simplicity.
This assumption shouldn’t have a big impact on the result of this analysis
for the following reason. A big portion (about 64.6 percent, see Table 1) of
unemployed individuals has some form of public health insurance. Only 12.44
percent of the unemployed individuals has no health insurance.
Table 3.1: Working Aged Individuals with Selected Sources of Health Insur-
ance from MEPS Data:
Employed Unemployed Total
obs. per obs. per obs. per
Total 7097 100 418 100 7515 100
Employment 5377 75.76 82 19.62 5459 72.64
Public 339 4.78 270 64.6 609 8.1
Private 278 3.92 14 3.35 292 3.89
Uninsured 1103 15.54 52 12.44 1155 15.37
Table 3.1 presents the sources of health insurance for the employed
and unemployed working aged individuals from MEPS. Total gives us how
58
many observations are in each sample (employed, unemployed and in total).
Employment, Public, Private and Uninsured give us how many observations
have employer-provided health insurance, public insurance, private insurance
(other than employer-provided) and don’t have health insurance at all re-
spectively. Employed, Unemployed and Total in the first row summarize
the number of observations falling into each category described above for em-
ployed individuals, unemployed individuals and in total respectively. There are
7515 observations in the sample. 7097 are employed and 418 are unemployed.
For the employed, 75.76 percent has employer-provided health insurance and
15.54 percent is uninsured. The percentages of employed individuals who have
public and private health insurance are 4.78 and 3.92 respectively. For the un-
employed, about 64.6 percent has some form of public health insurance. Only
12.44 percent of the unemployed individuals has no health insurance. The per-
centages of unemployed individuals who have employment-based (COBRA)
health insurance and private health insurance are 19.62 and 3.35 respectively.
3.4.4 Timing and Defining Maximization Problem
The timing of the model is the following: The agent enters period t
with a health stock of ht and then his employment status is revealed. If he
is employed, he then decides whether to buy health insurance or not. Then
a health shock φt is realized. After observing his health shock, the agent
chooses mt either to recover from a bad shock and/or improve his health.
Then he enters period t+1 with a health stock of ht+1 which evolves according
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to equation (3.3).
The maximization problem can be written as a dynamic programming
problem. Note that the state variables are health stock h and employment
status s.
The dynamic programming problem for the employed individuals is:
V (e, h) = max{Vc(e, h), Vnc(e, h)} (3.5)
subject to equation (3.2), where
Vc(e, h) =
∑
φ
µ(φ){max
m
u[yc(1− τ − pe)− αm, h] + β
∑
s′
pi(s′|e, h′)V (s′, h′)}
is the value of choosing health insurance coverage but getting a lower wage,
and
Vnc(e, h) =
∑
φ
µ(φ){max
m
u[(yc +R)(1− τ)−m,h] + β
∑
s′
pi(s′|e, h′)V (s′, h′)}
is the value of choosing without health insurance coverage but getting a higher
wage.
The dynamic programming problem for the unemployed individuals is:
V (u, h) =
∑
φ
µ(φ){max
m
u[θy − αm, h] + β
∑
s′
pi(s′|u, h′)V (s′, h′)} (3.6)
subject to
m ≥ 0 (3.7)
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3.5 Parameterizations
This section first describes how those parameter values in the theoret-
ical model are chosen and what parameters need to be estimated. Then it
presents the steps of this indirect inference estimation strategy. A descriptive
model which is the basis for this indirect inference procedure is then formulated
at the end of this section.
3.5.1 Parameters in the Structural Model
The utility function used in the computation has the following form:
U(c, h) =
(c1−σhσ)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ (3.8)
where 0 ≤ σ < 1 and ρ > 0 guarantee that uc > 0, uh > 0, ucc < 0 and uhh < 0
but the sign of uch depends on whether ρ is greater or less than 1.
The time period in the model is one year. The health stock is set
between 0 and 1 to match the data. β is set to 0.95. δ is the health depreciation
rate in the health evolution equation. δ is set to 0.01 based on the following
calculation. The lowest health level in the data is 11.73 and the highest is
67.24. This paper assumes that human beings can live up to 150 years if
without any accident or illness. Then, 67.24(1 − δ)150 = 11.73. This gives us
the value of δ. If this paper assumes that human beings can live up to 100
years without any accident or illness, δ is calculated to be 0.017. This does
not affect the main results of this paper. The coinsurance rate α is set to be
0.19 which is the average coinsurance rate from MEPS.
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The wage rate with health insurance coverage yc is normalize to 1. The
wage premium without health insurance coverage R is set to 0.1 and the em-
ployee portion of health insurance premium pe is set to 0.02. The wage differ-
ential between the compensation package without insurance coverage and with
insurance coverage is 12 percent in this paper (pe+R). In the literature of com-
pensating wage differentials for health insurance benefit provision, economic
theory suggests that what matters to profit maximization firms is the value of
the total compensation package that they must offer to attract labor services.
To remain competitive, the firm must reduce wages by 1 dollar for each 1 dollar
increase in health insurance expenditures. However, the empirical estimation
often results in a positive relationship between health expenditures and wages
which contradicts the theory. This is mainly because of the lack of the suit-
able data (Smith and Ehrenberg, 1983) since we only observe individuals who
end up having health insurance or not but we don’t observe the alternative
forgone offers. With the usual data, we are comparing the insurance choices
of different individuals. However, the workers with higher abilities will work
in the firm with both higher wage and better health insurance plan. MaCurdy
and Rapoport (2003) is able to identify the health insurance and wage tradeoff
for the low-skilled workers in the US which is about 9 percent. The sample
of that study consists of the individuals who switch between jobs with and
without health insurance. Olson(2002) finds that wives with own employer
health insurance accept a wage about 20 percent lower than what they would
have received working in a job without benefits. That study tests wage differ-
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ential theory for employer-provided health insurance by modeling the wages
of married women employed full-time in the labor market. Husband’s union
status, husband’s firm size, and husband’s health coverage through his job are
used as instruments for his wife’s own employer health benefits. The wage
differential in this paper is set between the above two estimates. Later version
of this paper might estimate this wage differential as well.
This paper takes policy parameters θ and τ as exogenous. θ is set to
0.25 for the following reason. The U.I. replacement ratio in the United States
is about 0.5 which usually lasts for six months. Since the unemployment
duration in this model is assumed to be 1 year so the U.I. replacement ratio
is set to be 0.25 in this paper and τ is set to 0.15 which is the average federal
tax rate in the United States.
The parameters need to be estimated by Indirect Inference are Θ =
{σ ρ a b z}. σ and ρ are preference parameters. a and b are parameters in the
health stock evolution equation. z is the health shock parameter.
3.5.2 Indirect Inference
The structural model parameters are estimated using the method of
indirect inference. For arbitrary values of the vector of parameters Θ, the
dynamic programming problem is solved and policy functions are generated.
Using these policy functions, the decision rule is simulated to create a simu-
lated version of the data to match. One then chooses a descriptive statistical
model that provides a rich description of the patterns of covariation in the
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data. Such a descriptive model can be estimated on both the simulated data
from the structural model, and on the actual observed data. This then gives
us two sets of coefficients to match, Ψs(Θ) and Ψd.
The estimate Θˆ is pinned down by minimizing the weighted distance
between the actual and simulated coefficients from the descriptive models.
Formally, it solves
£(Θ) = min
Θ
[Ψd −Ψs(Θ)]′W [Ψd −Ψs(Θ)] (3.9)
where W is a weighting matrix. The method of indirect inference will generate
a consistent estimate of θ. The weighting matrix,W, is constructed as the
inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients estimated from
the MEPS.
Since the Ψs(Θ) function is not analytically tractable, the minimization
is performed using numerical techniques. A simulated annealing algorithm is
used to perform the optimization in order to obtain the global minimum in
parameter space independent of starting values.
3.5.3 Descriptive Model
The descriptive model consists of two linear equations which are exten-
sively estimated in the literature of health economics.3 These equations are
3Currie and Madrian (1999) has a detailed review of them. Stratmann (1999) estimates
the effect of doctor visits on work day loss using the types of health insurance as instruments
for doctor visits.
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health equation and medical expenditure equation. They take the following
forms:
ht+1 = α1m
o
t + α2ht + α3htm
o
t +X1α4 + ε1t
mot = γ1ht + γ2st +X2γ3 + ε2t (3.10)
where h is individual’s health, s is individual’s employment status and m
is individual’s out-of-pocket medical expenditure.4 X1 and X2 are control
variables in these equations. Since these control variables are not modeled in
the structural model, it is assumed that the agents in the structural model are
homogenous in them. The MEPS coefficients which are going be matched by
the simulated coefficients are {α1 α2 α3 γ1 γ2}. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the
definitions and the summary statistics of all the variables in these equations.
In the health equation, medical expenditure is expected to have a pos-
itive effect on health but the coefficient in the OLS regression is usually neg-
ative. Last period health is expected to have a positive effect on this period
health.
In the medical expenditure equation, conditional on the same employed
status, healthier individuals are expected to spend less on their medical bill
and therefore, the coefficients is expected to be negative. Conditional on the
same health level, the employed individuals are expected to spend more on
4Here, out-of-pocket medical expenditure is in the form of the percentage of income in
order to match the simulated data from the structural model. In order to use the medical
expenditure share, the individuals without any income or with the medical expenditure
share greater than 1 are out of sample.
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their medical care and therefore the coefficient is expected to be positive but
in the reduced form regressions, the coefficient is significantly negative.
The coefficients on the control variables in the two equations all have
their expected signs. These two equations are estimated separately by OLS
regression. The results are reported in Table 3.4.
There are six parameters to pin down in the structural model but there
are only five coefficients from the descriptive model. The additional moment
used is the health insurance take-up rate for the employed individuals from
MEPS (Table 3.1) which is 0.8446. As a result,
Ψd = {−0.4249 0.5325 0.5508 − 0.0918 − 0.0437 0.8446}.
3.6 Estimation Results
The estimation procedure described in the previous section gives us
the following results of the structural parameters and the coefficients from the
simulated data:
From Table 3.6, we can see that the simulated coefficients match the
MEPS coefficients quite well. Interestingly, the simulated α1, the coefficient
of medical expenditure in the health equation, is negative even though in the
health evolution equation of the structural model, medical expenditure only
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Table 3.2: Variable definitions:
Dependent variables
healtht+1 physical component summary index* at the end of period t,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
medicalt total amount of out-of-pocket medical expenditure
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age Individual’s actual age
sex 1 if male, 0 otherwise
race 1 if white, 0 otherwise
mar 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Additional independent variables appearing
in the health equation
healtht physical component summary index at the end of period t-1,
0 is the lowest heath level, 100 is the highest
Additional independent variables appearing
in the medical expenditure equation
employedt employment status at period t: 1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise
*Refer Appendix 1 for the description of health measure used in this paper.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the sample:
Variables Sample Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
healtht+1/100 0.51 0.08 0.1173 0.6724
medicalot /incomet 0.02 0.06 0 0.9983
Independent Variables appearing in all the equations
age/100 0.41 0.11 0.19 0.64
sex 0.49 0.50 0 1
race 0.81 0.39 0 1
mar 0.62 0.49 0 1
Additional independent variables appearing
in the health equation
healtht/100 0.51 0.09 0.1321 0.6713
Additional independent variables appearing
in the medical expenditure equation
employedt 0.94 0.23 0 1
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of OLS estimation
Variables Coefficients of The Variables Std
Health equation
cons 0.2646 0.0066
medicalot /incomet -.4249 0.053
healtht/100 0.5325 0.0103
(healtht/100)(medical
o
t /incomet) 0.5508 0.1139
age/100 -.0735 0.0070
sex 0.0047 0.0016
race 0.0028* 0.0020
mar 0.0042 0.0016
R2 0.3962
Medical expenditure equation
cons 0.0950 0.0059
healtht/100 -.0918 0.0087
employedt -.0437 0.0032
age/100 0.0509 0.0064
sex -.0138 0.0014
race 0.0057 0.0018
mar -.0050 0.0015
R2 0.0863
No of observations 7515
*the coefficient is not significant at 5 percent significant level.
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Table 3.5: Structural Parameter Estimates:
σ ρ a b z
Estimated V alue 0.1839 1.7239 0.1398 0.8828 0.6679
Standard Error 0.0021 0.0271 0.0009 0.0014 0.0009
Table 3.6: Coefficients and Moments from the MEPS and Simulated Data:
α1 α2 α3 γ1 γ2 turate £(Θ)
MEPS -0.4249 0.5325 0.5508 -0.0918 -0.0437 0.8446
Simulated -0.1508 0.4768 -0.0247 -0.2857 -0.0724 0.8993 566
impacts the health in the positive way because parameters a and b are both
positive. This is caused by the endogeneity problem in the reduced form health
production function regression. Something in the error term might be corre-
lated with the medical expenditure in the reduced form health production
function (Refer Han (2005)). The fact reflects that reduced form regression
results sometimes give us the wrong information without knowing the struc-
tural model behind it because of some correlation issues. The only simulated
coefficient which failed to match the data coefficient is the coefficient on cross
term of medical expenditure and heath status. A partial explanation for the
lack of fit of this moment is the low weight placed on the relative standard
deviation compared to weights on the other moments, as determined by the
inverse of the variances of the respective moments from the MEPS.
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From a statistical perspective, the model is rejected since the reported
values of £(Θ) are still high compare to the cut off value. However, in this set-
ting, this reflects the fact that the coefficients are calculated from a very large
panel data set, implying very small standard deviations of the coefficients (and
a very large W). Given how precisely the micro coefficients are estimated from
the actual data, virtually any model would be formally rejected with even very
modest deviations of the simulated coefficients from the actual coefficients. As
we have emphasized above, the fit of the model in the last line of Table 3.6
is actually quite good in terms of matching the data coefficients on both a
qualitative and quantitative basis.
3.7 Welfare Analysis
3.7.1 Policy Experiment and Welfare Measure
With the structural parameters being estimated, this paper is able to
simulate individuals’ policy function and decision rules after imposing the
mandatory employer-provided health insurance. For example, the employed
individuals don’t have the no-insurance option anymore. The wage now is
yc−pe. Then, the welfare cost is measured by µ where V¯ b(yd(1−µ)) = V¯ a(yd).
V¯ b is the average utility before the mandate and V¯ a is the average utility after
the mandate. If µ is negative, then it is welfare gain instead of cost. If µ is
positive, it reflects the percentage of the income all the agents in the economy
are willing to give up in order to avoid this mandate. If µ is negative, it reflects
the percentage of the income all the agents in the economy are willing to pay
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to for this mandate.
3.7.2 Measuring the Welfare Cost
I assume that immediately after this mandate, the firm cancels the no-
insurance option and adjust the wage to yc − pe and the health insurance is
in the total compensation package to the worker. In the short run, no budget
balance rule is imposed and therefore,we don’t worry about the tax issue for
now. As a result, this paper can only measure the cost of this mandate for now.
There are two regions we need to consider: not affected region and worse-off
region. The not affected region includes those individuals who are employed
and already chose the health insurance option before the mandate. Their
disposable income remains the same as before and therefore, their decision
rules on the medical expenditure choices. The worse-off regions includes those
individuals who are employed but didn’t choose the health insurance before
the mandate. It is not hard to see why this group is worse off since they are
forced to choose something which they did’t want before the mandate. The
µ calculated from the simulation is 0.007. In another word, the agents in
this economy are willing to give up 0.7 percent of GDP in total to avoid this
mandate in the short run.
In the long run, even though this mandate eliminates individuals’ choices,
it does guarantee a healthier population and decreases the society’s burden.
As a result, the welfare change could go either way. Less people will collect
unemployed insurance and more people are paying the income tax. This could
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result in a decrease in the tax rate or an increase in the unemployment benefits.
This paper is only dealing with the partial equilibrium for now and measuring
the cost of mandatory health insurance. Later version of this paper might
consider simulating the general equilibrium effect of this mandate.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper measures the cost of mandatory employer-provided health
insurance policy by comparing the nation’s welfare with and without this pol-
icy. This paper allows the individuals to choose their own medical expenses to
improve their health status and in turn increase their job opportunities when
facing the unexpected health shocks in a dynamic structural model. In this
model, they also choose to have the health insurance coverage or not accord-
ing to their own characteristics. The structural parameters in the model are
estimated by matching the model’s implications with individual observations
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as part of a minimum
distance estimation routine. The mandate further distort the market equilib-
rium from the competitive equilibrium. It suppresses individuals’ choices and
will result in inefficiency. The welfare cost measured from this paper is 0.7
percent of GDP.
Later version of the paper will simulate the general equilibrium effect
of this mandate to incorporate the welfare gain from this mandate.
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Appendix 1
Appendix for Chapter 1
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Estimation results of OLS estimation:
Variables in The Equations Coefficients of The Variables Standard Error
Health equation
cons 2.3421 0.0604
employedt 0.1923 0.0179
medicalt/1000 -.2047 0.0216
age/10 -.0829 0.0065
sex 0.0159* 0.0150
race 0.0363 0.0187
mar 0.0521 0.0155
edu 0.1116 0.0177
smoke -.0647 0.0175
phyact 0.0987 0.0147
seatbelt 0.0293* 0.0174
healtht−1/10 0.5493 0.0093
healtht−1/10medicalt/1000 0.0271 0.0046
R2 0.4814
Labor force participation equation
cons -.2002 0.0394
healtht 0.0359 0.0031
age 0.1346 0.0179
sex 0.0052* 0.0072
race 0.0063* 0.0070
mar 0.0309 0.0085
edu 0.0212 0.0067
age2 -.0179 0.0021
numchi -.0050* 0.0054
child5 -.0402 0.0177
employedt−1 0.7357 0.0068
spousein -.0006 0.0001
sexnchi 0.0157 0.0052
sexchi5 0.0207 0.0158
marnchi -.0131 0.0061
marchi5 0.0080* 0.0193
R2 0.6502
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Estimation results of OLS estimation(Continued):
Variables in The Equations Coefficients of The Variables Standard Error
Medical expenditure equation
cons 1.1322 0.0885
employedt -.0721 0.0290
healtht -.2405 0.0133
age 0.1360 0.0102
sex -.1622 0.0236
race 0.1901 0.0296
mar -.0770 0.0287
edu 0.2050 0.0285
hmo -.1492 0.0260
gatekeeper -.0478* 0.0442
ppo 0.0485* 0.0334
spousein 0.0016 0.0005
R2 0.1044
No of observations 8896
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